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OVER-DETENTION: ASYLUM-SEEKERS, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND PATH 
DEPENDENCY 
INTRODUCTION 
e have seen this problem before.1 We have examined the 
shocking case studies of asylum-seekers detained cate-
gorically and for prolonged periods of time before.2 We have 
watched the United States shirk their international legal com-
mitments to ensure the dignity and humanity of refugees be-
fore.3 Yet despite the ongoing outcry of non-governmental or-
ganizations (“NGOs”)4 and legal scholars,5 and despite recent 
attempts by the United States government to improve the im-
migration system,6 little has been done to adequately improve 
the plight of detained asylum-seekers desperate to avoid re-
moval to a country in which they are likely to face persecution.7 
                                                                                                             
 1. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Com-
prehensive Immigration Reform in El Paso, Texas (May 10, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Remarks by the President] (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/10/remarks-president-
comprehensive-immigration-reform-el-paso-texas) (“[T]he truth is, we’ve of-
ten wrestled with the politics of who is and who isn’t allowed to come into 
this country. This debate is not new.”). 
 2. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, Excessive Use of Detention, in AMERICAN 
JUSTICE THROUGH IMMIGRANTS’ EYES 59, 59–72 (2004) [hereinafter A.B.A.]. 
 3. See, e.g., Bridget Kessler, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Prob-
lem? A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards 
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 571 (2009). 
 4. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: 
SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON (2009) [hereinafter SEEKING 
PROTECTION], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., A.B.A., supra note 2. 
 6. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with 
the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Appre-
hension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Exer-
cising Prosecutorial Discretion], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
 7. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6 (establish-
ing prosecutorial discretion policy), with Julia Preston, Obama Policy on De-
porting Used Unevenly, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2011, at A16 (alleging that de-
spite the factors to be considered in light of the prosecutorial discretion policy 
some groups see less benefits than others). 
W
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Against a backdrop of domestic concern—exacerbated by the 
attacks of 9/118—that immigration carries inherent risks, the 
United States has detained non-citizens of all types for a varie-
ty of reasons9 and pursuant to broad legal mandates.10 While 
there are admittedly some conditions under which detention 
can be a legitimate governmental function, many countries of-
ten subject entrants to detention that is “arbitrary” or “unnec-
essary” in violation of international human rights laws and 
norms.11 In the United States, the decision to categorically de-
tain asylum-seekers—despite the existence of potential solu-
tions in the international community, including successful 
                                                                                                             
 8. Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, Foreword to A.B.A., supra note 2, at v. 
The horrific September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York City 
and Washington, D.C. fundamentally changed the way our nation of 
immigrants views itself. Shameful episodes of anti-immigrant vio-
lence immediately after the attacks grabbed most of the headlines. 
But the more significant shift has played out more quietly in federal 
government offices where immigration policy is made. The United 
States government, acting on a new urgency to control immigration 
and American borders, has tightened an array of regulations that af-
fect how people from other countries may enter or live in the United 
States. 
Id. While the 9/11 terror attacks perhaps intensified this fear, the concern 
about the link between immigration and domestic terrorism may have begun 
much earlier. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Immigration Hurts City, New 
Yorkers Say in Poll, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at B4. 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF.OF IMMIGR.STAT. ANN. REP., 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-
2010.pdf (“Foreign nationals may be removable . . . for violations including 
failure to abide by the terms and conditions of admission or engaging in 
crimes such as violent crimes, document and benefit fraud, terrorist activity, 
and drug smuggling.”). While this Note will hone in upon the detention of 
refugees and asylum-seekers, it is important to remember that these groups 
are just a portion of the non-citizen population detained each year. See id. 
 10. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (expedited removal and, thus, 
mandatory detention, for all aliens arriving without having gone through the 
proper immigration channels). 
 11. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Alternatives to Detention of 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. POLAS/2006/03 (Apr. 2006) 
(by Ophelia Field & Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Alternatives to Detention] 
(finding that many states presume detention for asylum-seekers despite con-
trary interpretations of international laws). 
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NGO pilot efforts which use individualized risk-analysis12 and 
“Alternatives to Detention”13 (“ATD”) programs—may amount 
to unnecessary or arbitrary detention that violates interna-
tional human rights law.14 The arbitrary and unnecessary na-
ture of these detentions may have a particularly egregious im-
pact on the class of asylum-seekers15 affected, where the depri-
                                                                                                             
 12. Risk analysis is used in this Note to mean an individualized determi-
nation of a detained asylum-seeker’s eligibility for parole or release to an Al-
ternatives to Detention program, which includes an assessment of that indi-
vidual determining identity, risk of flight, potential for posing danger to the 
community, or regarding any other justification for release. See SEEKING 
PROTECTION, supra note 4, at 72–73. 
 13. “Alternatives to detention” is a term of art meaning an “alternative 
means of increasing the appearance and compliance of individual asylum 
seekers with asylum procedures and of meeting other legitimate concerns 
which States have attempted to address . . . through recourse to detention.” 
Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶ 4. They will be discussed in 
more depth throughout this Note. 
 14. See, e.g., UNHCR, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of 
Person and ‘Alternatives to Detention’ of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless 
Persons and Other Migrants, 51–87, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/01.Rev.1 (Apr. 
2011) (by Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Back to Basics]; Alternatives to Deten-
tion, supra note 11, at ¶¶  1–2 (presuming detention may violate international 
law). 
 15. A subtle distinction exists between a refugee and an asylum-seeker; 
the United States defines refugees as those seeking protection before they 
arrive in the country while asylum-seekers are seeking protection after arriv-
ing in the United States. DANIEL C. MARTIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STAT. ANN. FLOW REP., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2010, at 1, 
4 (2011). The Department of Homeland Security further separates affirma-
tive asylum-seekers, who apply for asylum at a port of entry or within one 
year of arrival in the United States, from defensive asylum-seekers, who file 
for asylum in order to avoid removal or those who are subject to expedited 
removal. Id. at 4. In contrast, international discourse distinguishes asylum-
seekers from refugees on the basis that asylum-seekers “are individuals who 
have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status 
have not yet been determined,” that is, their cases are still pending. 2009 
UNHCR Stat. Y.B. 13, http://www.unhcr.org/4ce532ff9.html. The distinction 
is irrelevant for the purposes of this Note because the language within U.S. 
statutes grants authorization to seek asylum to the same non-citizens as 
those protected in the international definitions of “refugee.” Compare 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (2012) with Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees [Refugee Convention], art. 1, July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 and Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees [Protocol to Refugee Convention], Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. This Note will focus on defensive asylum-seekers 
who announce their intention to seek asylum at the port of entry to the Unit-
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vation of liberty can exacerbate the traumas that led to their 
flight from their country of origin in the first place.16 
The United States has recognized that the immigration sys-
tem needs work.17 In the detention context, the United States 
has identified the need to incorporate risk analysis tools18 and 
ATDs in order to improve the process.19 However, the steps the 
United States has taken to develop and implement these tools 
have significantly deviated from the recommendations of ex-
perts in the field20 and have failed thus far to bring the country 
                                                                                                             
ed States and are thus trying to escape expedited removal and mandatory 
detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 16. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE 
INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (2000) [here-
inafter VERA], available at 
http://www.vera.org/download?file=615/finalreport.pdf (“[D]etaining every 
noncitizen is neither just nor humane. Many people in removal proceedings 
are fleeing persecution in their own countries . . . Detention is an ordeal they 
should be spared.”). 
 17. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
(2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_bluepri
nt.pdf. 
 18. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. AND CUST. 
ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
20–21 (2009), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-
detention-rpt.pdf. Dr. Schriro’s report identified a need for a “validated risk 
assessment instrument specifically calibrated for the U.S. alien population. 
The tool should assess initial and ongoing suitability for participation [in 
ATDs].” Id. at 20. 
 19. Id. 
 20. LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE, UNLOCKING LIBERTY: A 
WAY FORWARD FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION POLICY 21 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter UNLOCKING LIBERTY] available at http://lirs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCKINGLIBERTY.pdf. Asylum experts 
relevant to this Note include international bodies, such as the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, and NGOs like Amnesty International, Human 
Rights First, Vera Institute of Justice, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Service, and International Detention Coalition. See UNHCR, UNHCR’s Re-
vised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Deten-
tion of Asylum-Seekers, (Feb. 26 1999), [hereinafter UNHCR Guide-
lines] available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b3f844.html; Ex-
ecutive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Detention of Asy-
lum-Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended 
Practice, UNHCR, U.N. Doc. EC/49/SC/CRP.13 (Jun. 4 1999) [hereinafter Ex-
Com on Detention]; Amnesty Int’l, Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers: 
Alternatives to Immigration Detention, AI Index POL 33/001/2009 (April 1, 
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into compliance with international law.21 This Note argues that 
unless the United States incorporates the recommendations of 
asylum experts to use thorough risk-analysis in creating an in-
dividualized ATD program, it will be unlikely to reduce the un-
necessary or arbitrary detention of many asylum-seekers and 
will therefore be unable to meet the minimum human rights 
standards required under international law.22 
Part I of this Note looks at the current U.S. immigration de-
tention system and some of the now well-established failures of 
the asylum detention process preventing the country from con-
forming to international human rights laws and norms. Part II 
explores the rationales behind detention of asylum-seekers 
with an eye toward how risk-analysis and ATDs can improve 
the system. Part III analyzes the current momentum for reform 
of the system in the context of path dependency, the notion that 
the future of the system will be dependent upon—and con-
strained by—decisions made now,23 and addresses why it is es-
sential to implement the recommendations of asylum experts 
now. Part IV discusses how the United States, by ignoring the 
recommendations of asylum experts regarding risk-analysis 
and alternatives to detention, has continuously violated inter-
national law. Part V lists the additional policy benefits to the 
United States should it adopt the proposed changes of asylum 
experts. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Current Status of the Detention System 
Since its transition from the former Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (“INS”) to its current home as a subset of the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Immigration 
                                                                                                             
2009) [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l]; SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA, 
supra note 16; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20; R. SAMPSON ET AL., THE 
INTERNATIONAL DETENTION COALITION, THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES: A HANDBOOK 
FOR PREVENTING UNNECESSARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2011) available at 
http://idcoalition.org/cap/handbook/. 
 21. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Pres-
ton, supra note 7. 
 22. E.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20; Alternatives to Detention, 
supra note 11. 
 23. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
332, 332 (1985). 
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and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division has rapidly expand-
ed the scope of its detention power and the numerical capacity 
of individuals in detention.24 The United Nations has defined 
detention as “the deprivation of liberty in a confined place, such 
as a prison or purpose-built reception or holding centre. It is at 
the extreme end of the spectrum of deprivations of liberty . . . 
.”25 In the U.S. immigration context, the purview of detention 
includes “the authority . . . to detain aliens who may be subject 
to removal for violations of administrative immigration law.”26 
Throughout fiscal year 2010, ICE detained 363,064 non-
citizens.27 ICE now has bed-space to house 33,400 detainees 
daily and averages 33,330 detainees per day—a notable in-
crease from the daily average of 27,990 in 2007.28 As of 2009, 
asylum-seekers constituted about 1400 of these daily detainee 
totals.29 In addition to a budget of over $2 billion for its immi-
gration Detention and Removal Office (“DRO”), Congress gave 
DHS unsolicited additional funding to increase the total num-
ber of beds by 600, to 34,000 total, in fiscal year 2012.30 The 
                                                                                                             
 24. See SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 2, 4. 
 25. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 8. See also Michael Flynn, Immigra-
tion Detention and Proportionality, Global Detention Project, Working Paper 
No. 4, 7–9 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/publications/GDP_detention_
and_proportionality_workingpaper.pdf (“Coming up with a one-size-fits-all 
definition [of detention] is a challenging undertaking, especially when as-
sessing a phenomenon that can radically change shape from one country to 
the next.”); Holding Patterns: Can Advocacy Efforts to Reform Migration De-
tention Inadvertently Lead to the Growth of Detention Regimes?, OPEN 
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, 34:00–38:40 (March 28, 2012), 
http://c482907.r7.cf2.rackcdn.com/migration-detention-20120328.mp3 [here-
inafter Holding Patterns] (discussing different definitions of detention). 
 26. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4. 
 27. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 9, at 4. This statistic 
includes all categories of non-citizens, not just asylum-seekers. Id. 
 28. Fact Sheet: Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT [ICE], http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detention-
mgmt.htm (last accessed June 22, 2012). ICE notes that these numbers do 
not include counts for non-citizens detained with the Mexican Interior Repat-
riation Program or the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Id. 
 29. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 11. 11,244 people were granted affirmative 
asylum in fiscal year 2010, with the highest percentage of those coming from 
China. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 5. This follows a general decreasing trend 
in grants of asylum over the past several years. Id. 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 112-91, at 52 (2011); NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE 
MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION 
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amount of available bed space may affect the amount of time 
an individual is detained.31 The average time of detention for 
asylum-seekers is controversial; some experts say it ranges 
from 47 to 109 days, while others indicate that it might be 
much longer.32 
Within the U.S. system, detention often consists of placement 
in county jails or commercialized detention centers.33 While 
this Note does not explore human rights violations or im-
provements extant within the detention system beyond its ar-
bitrary or unnecessary overuse, it is worthy of mention that 
extensive scholarship explores issues involving the general 
criminalization of the civil immigration system;34 the effects of 
                                                                                                             
DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetent
ion.pdf. 
 31. Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: 
Advancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through 
Human Rights Frameworks, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 157 (2008). 
 32. Renewing America’s Commitment to the Refugee Convention: The Refu-
gee Protection Act of 2010: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (statement for the record from Physicians for Human Rights), availa-
ble at http://rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/PHR%20Testimony,%205-19-10.pdf; 
UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 12. The U.S. Supreme Court case 
Zadvydas v. Davis, which declared detentions of more than six months to be 
unreasonable and at odds with the U.S. Constitution, does not protect asy-
lum-seekers because it only addressed the detention of those who were de-
tained while awaiting deportation, as opposed to awaiting asylum proceed-
ings. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 33. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of Ameri-
can States, Report on Immigration in the United States: Detention and Due 
Process, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc.78/10, 85–87 (2010) [hereinafter IACHR]. As of 
2009, approximately 50% of all detainees were held in county jails that also 
contained prisoners. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 10. 
With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain al-
iens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial 
and sentenced felons. ICE relies primarily on correctional incarcera-
tion standards designed for pre-trial felons and on correctional prin-
ciples of care, custody, and control. These standards impose more re-
strictions and carry more costs than are necessary to effectively 
manage the majority of the detained population. 
Id. at 2–3. 
 34. See generally Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010). Criminal and immigrant populations in 
detention are treated essentially the same. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4. 
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family and child detention;35 and the lack of adequate medical 
care,36 access to legal representation,37 and workable civil 
standards for detention.38   
B. The Process for Detaining Asylum-Seekers in the United 
States 
Currently, non-citizens entering the United States without 
legally having gone through the proper immigration process in 
advance are automatically placed in expedited removal pro-
ceedings unless they express their desire to apply for asylum to 
an immigration officer.39 Once they do so, an immigration of-
ficer will detain the asylum-seeker pending the filing of their 
asylum application and an interview with an asylum officer.40 
From this point forward, the asylum-seeker is subject to man-
datory detention, unless and until they can establish a basis for 
discretionary parole or they are deported.41 
After filing for asylum, the detainee proceeds to what is re-
ferred to as a “credible fear hearing” or “credible fear inter-
                                                                                                             
 35. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 58-62. 
 36. See generally Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and 
Mental Health Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the 
United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 693 (2009). 
 37. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S. 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM–A TWO-YEAR REVIEW, 30 (2011) [hereinafter 
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf. 
 38. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4 (“ICE adopted standards that are based 
upon corrections law and promulgated by correctional organizations to guide 
the operation of jails and prisons.”). 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)(2012). Some exceptions do exist to bar an 
arriving alien from applying for asylum in the United States. Notably, he or 
she cannot have come from a safe third country where he or she could have 
sought asylum; additionally, subject to extenuating circumstances, he or she 
cannot have waited more than a year to apply for asylum after arriving in the 
United States or have had a previous unsuccessful asylum application. 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). While both are members of ICE, asylum 
officers are distinct from immigration officers in that they have “professional 
training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques compa-
rable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of [asylum] applications” and 
that more experienced asylum officers supervise them. 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(E). 
 41. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra 
note 9, at 2. Parole will be discussed in more depth below. 
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view,”42 which may take place up to forty-five days after the 
filing of an application for asylum.43 At the hearing, one seek-
ing asylum must establish to the satisfaction of an asylum of-
ficer that he or she has a “credible fear of persecution” in his or 
her home country.44 This fear is defined as “a significant possi-
bility, taking into account the credibility of the statements 
made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and other such 
facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish 
eligibility for asylum” under existing U.S. law.45 At a credible 
fear hearing, an ICE officer has the sole ability to determine if 
the asylum-seeker has a credible fear that will likely support a 
future favorable asylum ruling by an immigration judge.46 This 
is the first, but not only, opportunity for individual discretion 
or arbitrariness to seep into the asylum process.47 If the deter-
mination of the asylum officer is unfavorable, the asylum-
seeker will be slated for expedited removal “without further 
hearing or review.”48 If favorable, the asylum officer will refer 
the asylum-seeker for asylum adjudication in front of an immi-
gration judge.49 By statute, the entire proceeding, excluding 
appeal, should be concluded within 180 days, although the 
                                                                                                             
 42. E.g., Brané & Lunholm, supra note 31, at 150. 
 43. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)(2012). 
 44. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 45. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). Authority for asylum itself is based on 8 
U.S.C. § 1158. The United States limits the available categories of persecu-
tion for which one can claim asylum to “race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2012). 
 46. Gwynne Skinner, International Law Weekend 2009-I: Bringing Inter-
national Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the United States, 16 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 270, 275 n.18 (2008). Other than a 
lack of credible fear, factors that might lead to rejection of a claim at this 
point may include “committing certain crimes, posing a national security 
threat, engaging in the persecution of others, or firmly resettling in another 
country before coming to the United States.” MARTIN, supra note 15, at 4. 
 47. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that discretion leads 
to arbitrariness). For a criticism of the United States’ ability to determine 
credibility as being arbitrary in relation to refugee determinations, see An-
drew F. Moore, Unsafe in America: A Review of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third 
Country Agreement, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 237–238 (2007). 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). If the asylum-seeker makes a “prompt” 
request, he or she may have the decision reviewed by an immigration judge, 
which by statute must happen no later than seven days after the negative 
credible fear determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). 
 49. Skinner, supra note 46, at 275. 
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statute provides for the extension of this timeframe for “excep-
tional circumstances.”50 
As noted, prior to being granted asylum by an immigration 
judge, arriving asylum-seekers are subject to mandatory deten-
tion unless they can establish their basis for discretionary pa-
role.51 This presumption in favor of detention is codified in 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which authorizes the Attorney General, 
in his discretion[, to] parole into the United States temporari-
ly under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-
by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United 
States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as 
an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such pa-
role shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been 
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the 
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case 
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of 
any other applicant for admission to the United States.52 
Thus, asylum-seekers will only be paroled if an individualized 
case analysis reveals there is an “urgent humanitarian reason” 
or “significant public benefit” for so doing. 53 This basis for pa-
role has also been defined as applying to those classes of aliens 
“whose continued detention is not in the public interest as de-
termined by [ICE officials].”54 In a policy shift effective early 
2010, ICE began to interpret parole in the “public interest” un-
der this section to require “that the alien’s identity is sufficient-
ly established, the alien poses neither a flight risk nor a danger 
                                                                                                             
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii). 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii) (2012); Memoran-
dum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Parole of Arriving 
Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, at 2 (Dec. 8, 
2009) [hereinafter Credible Fear Parole], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-
parole_of_arriving_aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf. 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)(2012). 
 53. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5) (2012). Other classes enumerated under this sec-
tion are more readily eligible for parole because they do not include a discre-
tionary determination by an ICE official; these include individuals with seri-
ous medical conditions, pregnant women, juveniles, and those who are serv-
ing as witnesses in court proceedings. Id. 
 54. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Credible Fear 
Parole, supra note 51, at 2, 6–8. 
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to the community, and no additional factors weigh against the 
release of the alien.”55 
While this development is a positive shift because it stream-
lined and increased the transparency of parole decisions, the 
proof requirements remain an especially weighty burden for 
asylum-seekers.56 Despite apparent sympathy to the circum-
stances of asylum-seekers, the policy emphasizes the discre-
tionary nature of parole and requires the asylum-seeker to bear 
the burden of demonstrating this information to the satisfac-
tion of an ICE officer.57 The policy standards themselves recog-
nize the inherent difficulties for asylum-seekers to provide ad-
equate documentation or produce credible witnesses to corrobo-
rate their claims on asylum matters.58 These difficulties may 
include a lack of travel documents, often associated with an 
asylum-seeker’s unwillingness or inability to contact their for-
                                                                                                             
 55. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6. In 2011, Morton issued an 
additional directive, entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent 
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Ap-
prehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (“Exercising Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion”), which essentially incorporates the earlier memo and reiterates the 
discretion of ICE officers to grant parole to an asylum-seeker under specific 
circumstances. See Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6. ICE is 
quick to add that the established policy creates no private cause of action. 
Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 10. 
 56. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. The international community has 
reviewed and commented on the general shift in ICE detention policy under 
the Obama Administration. See, e.g., id. On the positive side, asylum-seekers 
no longer have to file for parole; a parole meeting is automatic within seven 
days of an asylum officer determining that the asylum-seeker has a credible 
fear of persecution. Id. There are provisions to improve the transparency of 
the process both through increased documentation and through informing 
asylum-seekers about the process and their rights within it. Id. However, 
there are criticisms in the international community that these changes do not 
adequately address the problems for detainees, as they still bear a potentially 
“insurmountable” burden of proof on the identity, flight risk, and security 
issues. Id. Furthermore, because of the discretionary nature of the process, 
there is great potential for arbitrary denials of parole, and thus arbitrary 
detention; this arbitrariness is especially obvious when considering regional 
disparities in parole denials. Id. Additionally, negative parole determinations 
remain reviewable only at the discretion of an ICE officer, which enforces the 
officer’s role as both “judge and jailer.” IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. See 
also Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. For the policy itself, see Exercising Prose-
cutorial Discretion, supra note 6. 
 57. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8. 
 58. Id. 
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mer government, or a lack of ties to any community within the 
United States as a result of their recent urgent arrival.59 Asy-
lum-seekers are additionally prejudiced because, by virtue of 
their situation, any attempt to meet this proof requirement to 
gain parole must be done while in detention.60 Moreover, the 
same set of challenges, particularly the notion that “detention 
will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity to pre-
sent his or her [case] or to have the assistance of counsel,”61 
limit the asylum-seeker’s ability to successfully obtain parole.62 
Furthermore, because the policy standards are non-binding, 
they can be changed at any time and thus do not provide any 
lasting guarantees even for the opportunity of parole.63 As a 
result, the system remains weighted in favor of continued de-
tention.64 
C. How the U.S. Detention System Violates International Hu-
man Rights Laws and Norms 
Numerous legal scholars and advocacy groups have argued 
that the U.S. detention policy—featuring a presumption in fa-
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. 
 60. Mark L. Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to 
Appointed Counsel for Manditorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal 
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing how deten-
tion leads to “cascading deprivations” of rights of those detained—for exam-
ple, the difficulties in obtaining counsel from detention may lead to higher 
rates of unsuccessful cases and time wasted arguing over appointed counsel 
for detainees); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in 
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL 
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 185, 223 (Erika Feller et al. 
eds., 2003) (“Detention will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity 
to present his or her case.”); SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 50 (“social iso-
lation is a significant issue for most detainees.”). The parole determination 
“typically occurs within three weeks of apprehension.” UNLOCKING LIBERTY, 
supra note 20, at 20. 
 61. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223. See also, Noferi, supra note 60, at 
25–26 (“The difficulty of challenging an immigration detention and case while 
detained is compounded by the inability of most detainees to secure counsel—
or, indeed, any adequate source of legal assistance.”). 
 62. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223; Noferi, supra note 60, at 25–
26. 
 63. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. 
 64. See Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8. See also IACHR, supra 
note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. 
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vor of detention—violates international obligations.65 Various 
treaties and conventions articulate an aversion to immigration 
detention in the vast majority of circumstances, finding it to be 
violative of human rights principles.66 This includes the more 
specific rules regarding asylum-seekers who declare their de-
sire to seek asylum once they are within the country to which 
they fled.67 “In most cases, only if an individual’s claim to refu-
gee status is examined before he or she is affected by an exer-
cise of State jurisdiction . . . can the State be sure that its in-
ternational obligations are met.”68 This pre-approval, however, 
may prove challenging for asylum-seekers to attain given that 
the persecution many of them are fleeing might not provide the 
time or opportunity to plan ahead and apply for protection in 
another country before leaving their home country.69 
The United States is not a party to all of such conventions or 
treaties,70 although it is arguably bound under customary in-
ternational laws71 or norms to abide by them anyway.72 Codifi-
                                                                                                             
 65. E.g., SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA, supra note 16, at 31–
32; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, 5–6; Brané & Lundholm, supra note 
31. 
 66. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (against 
arbitrary detention of all people); Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Proto-
col to Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); 1966 International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 9, 12 [hereinafter 
ICCPR] (against arbitrary and unnecessary detention). 
 67. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 66; Refugee Convention, supra note 15; 
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; ICCPR, supra note 66, arts. 9, 
12. 
 68. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 187 (emphasis in original). Here “State 
jurisdiction” indicates the country to which the asylum-seeker fled. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (recognizing that 
arriving aliens might not have travel documents because of flight). 
 70. For example, the United States “remains the only state, other than 
Somalia, which has not ratified the [Convention on the Rights of the Child],” 
a convention essential for guaranteeing rights of children and families in asy-
lum and other contexts. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 153. 
 71. Customary international law is “international law that derives from 
the practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding. This is one 
of the principal sources or building blocks of the international legal system.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (9th ed. 2009). 
 72. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111(1) (1987) (“Inter-
national law and international agreements of the United States are law of 
the United States and supreme over the law of the several States.”). See also 
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cation of customary international law declares that a country 
“violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it 
practices, encourages or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary de-
tention.”73 Admittedly, some international laws or norms have 
exigency exceptions that allow states to detain aliens in cases 
of “necessity.”74 However, as most of those detained do not pre-
sent any risks to the State from which they are seeking aid, 
these exigency exceptions do not justify the categorical deten-
tion of all asylum-seekers.75 
There are multiple international treaties that protect the 
rights of people seeking asylum, and many have prohibitions 
against “arbitrary” detention, “unnecessary” detention, or 
both.76 Beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”), the international community has recognized 
“the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.”77 Furthermore, the UDHR established that “no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”78 
While establishing these rights that would come to form the 
basis of international human rights law, the drafters of the 
UDHR did not define many of the terms they used, including 
“arbitrary.”79 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“1951 Convention”) expanded upon the UDHR by creating a 
multilateral treaty wherein “the contracting states shall not 
apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other 
                                                                                                             
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of 
our law.”). 
 73. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 702(e) (1987). 
 74. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); Goodwin-Gill, 
supra note 60, at 232. 
 75. See Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[L]ess than ten percent of asy-
lum applicants . . . disappear when they are released to proper supervision 
and facilities.”). 
 76. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 9 (against arbitrary detention); Refugee 
Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; 
ICCPR, supra note 66, at arts. 9, 12 (against arbitrary and unnecessary de-
tention). The two terms are interrelated, as detaining unnecessarily can con-
stitute arbitrariness. See, e.g. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157. 
 77. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III). 
 78. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added). 
 79. See UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III) (not defining terms used); The 
Foundation of International Human Rights Law, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last accessed June 22, 
2012) (UDHR as basis for field of international human rights law). 
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than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only 
be applied until their status in the country is regularized or 
they obtain admission into another country.”80 While detention 
for identity verification, public safety, and national security 
have been given as examples of detention that could potentially 
be considered “necessary,” and therefore permissible under the 
1951 Convention, some scholars have interpreted detention 
subsequent to these conditions to be only for extraordinary cir-
cumstances.81 While the United States did not sign the 1951 
Convention, it did ratify the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Conven-
tion that incorporated and modernized the Convention, thereby 
binding the United States to those international obligations.82 
In addition to the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol restrictions 
against unnecessary detention, the 1966 International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) prohibits deten-
tion from being “arbitrary.”83 Under Article 9 of the ICCPR, ar-
bitrary detention, though not precisely defined, is expressly 
prohibited.84 Article 9 further holds speedy access to a court 
proceeding to be essential for anyone “deprived of his liberty by 
. . . detention.”85 
Because much of the language in these treaties is vague or 
undefined, the international community seeks guidance from 
both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) and the Executive Committee of the UNHCR (“Ex-
                                                                                                             
 80. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2) (emphasis added). 
 81. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 232. 
 82. Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, 
supra note 15. The United States signed the 1967 Protocol without any reser-
vations, understandings, or declarations (“RUDs”) relevant to this analysis. 
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15. 
 83. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1). The United States ratified the ICCPR 
in 1992, attaching RUDs that limit some provisions, but none specifically 
relevant to this analysis. Id. The United States declared the Convention to be 
non-self-executing, or incapable of taking effect without implementing legis-
lation. Id; Kessler, supra note 3, at 577; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining self-executing). 
 84. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1); Kessler, supra note 3, at 580 (“In the 
context of Article 9(1), [arbitrary] encompasses not just unlawful detentions, 
but also all those that are unjust, unpredictable, unreasonable, capricious, 
and disproportional.”). 
 85. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(4). 
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Com”) in interpreting its obligations to refugees.86 The ExCom 
has stated that 
[W]ide discretionary powers [to detain] . . . are far too fre-
quently applied in an arbitrary manner. For instance, a large 
number of asylum-seekers are detained on the formal basis 
that it is likely that they will abscond . . . international 
standards dictate that there must be some substantive basis 
for such a conclusion in the individual case.87 
The specious justification of needing to prove an asylum-
seeker’s identity is yet another example of arbitrariness in the 
detention process.88 Proving identity “should not routinely be 
judged necessary” in light of the circumstances which lead asy-
lum-seekers to flee persecution in the first place.89 The ExCom 
guidelines emphasize that implementing individualized, 
“prompt, mandatory and periodic review of all detention orders 
before an independent and impartial body” of the destination-
state’s need to detain is fundamental to avoiding arbitrary de-
tention.90 Furthermore, the UNHCR has continually advocated 
for a presumption against detention.91 
Scholars have additionally argued that arbitrary detention 
exists where there is “inappropriateness, injustice, and lack of 
predictability” in the detention process.92 “Arbitrary detention 
occurs when refugee applicants are detained on the basis of 
broad criteria that do not allow for individualized determina-
                                                                                                             
 86. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 n.22 (1987). The 
United States Supreme Court has held that at least one set of guidelines es-
tablished by the UNHCR is helpful in interpreting 1967 Protocol obligations. 
Id. In discussing the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status, written by the UNHCR, the Court said, “the Handbook pro-
vides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress 
sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to 
the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” Id. The Court noted that the 
guidance, while helpful, was non-binding. Id. See also, Skinner, supra note 
46, at 278–79. 
 87. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3. 
 88. Id. at 4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 3–4. 
 91. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 20, at 3; UNHCR, Detention of Refu-
gees and Asylum-Seekers,  U.N. Doc. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986 (Oct. 13, 1986); Ex-
Com on Detention, supra note 20, at 1. 
 92. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 156–57 (quoting GUY GOODWIN-
GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (2d ed. 1996)). 
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tions of the need for detention, when there is no administrative 
or judicial review, or when detention occurs for disproportion-
ate or extended periods.”93 
U.S. practices are arbitrary because detention is applied as a 
“blanket policy;” chances for parole—varying “anywhere from 
0.5% to 98%”—are inconsistent;94 judicial review, in practice, is 
either unavailable or limited by judges citing a lack of jurisdic-
tion; and because compliance rates are quite high, further sup-
porting “the argument that the detention of asylum seekers is 
arbitrary because it is unnecessary.”95 Moreover, there is evi-
dence to suggest arbitrariness in parole decisions, as some 
watchdog groups have found that the choice to parole an asy-
lum-seeker can sometimes be made based on available bed 
space in detention centers rather than the merits of an individ-
ual’s claim for release.96 As put forth in the Restatement Third, 
“[A] single, brief, arbitrary detention by an official of a state 
party to one of the principal international agreements might 
violate that agreement; arbitrary detention violates customary 
law if it is prolonged and practiced as state policy.”97 This 
weighs against the United States’ categorical detention of all 
asylum-seekers because, without sufficient individualized as-
sessment, there is no way to ensure detention is necessary.98 
Additionally, because the U.S. policy leaves determinations of 
credible fear and parole to the discretion of individual ICE of-
ficers, any localized breach or non-compliance can result in in-
ternational law violations.99  
The international community has noticed the United States’ 
violations of international law.100 Following his May 2007 visit, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants ex-
pressed his “serious concern” with the status of the U.S. deten-
                                                                                                             
 93. Moore, supra note 47, at 267. 
 94. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157 (“[Parole policy] seems to 
depend more upon the personality of the district director and the available 
bed space than it does upon a reasoned policy of release criteria.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Moore, supra note 47, at 263, 269. 
 97. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 cmt. h (1987). 
 98. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 219. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants, Mission to 
the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2008) (by 
Jorge Bustamante) [hereinafter Mission to the United States]; IACHR, supra 
note 33, at 144. 
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tion system.101 The Special Rapporteur “[came] to the conclu-
sion that the United States ha[d] failed to adhere to its inter-
national obligations to make the human rights of the 37.5 mil-
lion migrants living in the country . . . a national priority, using 
a comprehensive and coordinated national policy based on clear 
international obligations.”102 His report went on to discuss the 
various violations of international law within the United 
States103 and made recommendations for improvement that in-
cluded the complete elimination of mandatory detention.104 
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
produced in 2011 a comprehensive report on the U.S. immigra-
tion and detention system.105 Along with urging the United 
States to “comply fully with the international human rights ob-
ligations under the American Declaration [of the Rights and 
Duties of Man],”106 the Commission advocated for the country’s 
discontinuation of mandatory detention practices.107 
II. DISASSOCIATING FROM PRESUMPTIONS THAT FAVOR 
DETENTION 
In order to become compliant with international law, the U.S. 
detention practices for refugees and asylum-seekers need to 
align more closely with the protection-based mandates of the 
aforementioned provisions that proscribe detention from being 
either arbitrary or unnecessary.108 To do this, the United States 
needs to utilize risk-analysis and ATDs to release or parole de-
tainees held without legitimate justification.109 However, no 
alternative program can be successful until the U.S. immigra-
tion system shifts its application of immigration statutes from 
                                                                                                             
 101. Mission to the United States, supra note 100, at 2. 
 102. Id. at 3. 
 103. See generally id. 
 104. Id. at 24. 
 105. IACHR, supra note 33. 
 106. Id. at 155. In its reply to the draft version of the report, the United 
States was quick to point out that the American Declaration is “a nonbinding 
instrument that does not itself create legal rights or impose legal obligations 
on signatory states.” Id. at 7. The IACHR countered that the Declaration does 
create obligations for member and non-member states alike under the charter 
of the Organization of American States, the American regional counterpart to 
the United Nations, of which the United States is a member. Id. at 10. 
 107. Id. at 147. 
 108. See Part I.B., supra. 
 109. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, supra note 20, at 16. 
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the categorical mandatory detention of asylum-seekers to a 
more flexible system where detention is used only as a last re-
sort.110 Many asylum experts have advocated for this and have 
created programs based on the “presumption against deten-
tion” model.111 To understand how, by following suit, the Unit-
ed States could avoid arbitrary or unnecessary detention, it is 
first helpful to recognize the rationales it puts forth for using a 
mandatory detention policy in the first place.112 Section A 
enunciates what risks the United States assumes when, rather 
than detain, it releases asylum-seekers into an ATD program 
and, by extension, the community. Sections B and C seek to 
understand the potential benefits of effectively implemented 
risk analysis and ATD programs as compared to those current-
ly in operation within the U.S. system. 
A. Detention Rationales 
Countries often cite the inherent risks associated with admit-
ting aliens as a rationale for detaining them.113 As discussed in 
Part I.B, the current U.S. detention policy centers on these 
risks by presuming detention for aliens unless they are able to 
establish: 1) their identity, 2) that they are not a flight risk 
and, 3) that they are not a danger to society; or they must es-
tablish they have an additional extenuating circumstance that 
justifies their release.114 By exploring the scope of these inher-
ent risks, the United States can better address any actual risks 
and ultimately eliminate the use of detention that is excessive 
in matching the scope of that risk.115 
The United States justifies detention—at least until there is 
satisfactory proof of the asylum-seeker’s identity—by citing the 
need to ensure that the alien will comply with specific proceed-
ings, including meeting attendance, hearings, and, potentially, 
                                                                                                             
 110. See, e.g., JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 37, at 42. 
 111. See, e.g., SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20. 
 112. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 149–52 (exploring detention 
rationales). 
 113. See id. 
 114. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 2–3, 6–8. Extenuating circum-
stances include serious medical conditions, pregnancy, juvenile status, and 
aliens slated to serve as witnesses. 8 C.F.R § 212.5(b); Credible Fear Parole, 
supra note 51, at 2. 
 115. See Brané, supra note 31, at 149–52. 
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removal.116 The United States has declared, “asylum-related 
fraud is of genuine concern”117 and also wants to be certain be-
fore paroling an asylum-seeker that the person is not threaten-
ing to the community or the nation as a whole.118 Further, the 
current policy indicates that detention will continue if there are 
“serious adverse foreign policy consequences that may result if 
the alien is released or [if there are] overriding law enforce-
ment interests.”119 Moreover, the U.S. immigration system is 
bogged down120 and the caseload in immigration courts is high, 
increasing the time that asylum-seekers in detention must wait 
for their case to be heard.121 
Yet if the U.S. method of detention is meant to serve as a de-
terrence to emigration, the strategy itself would violate inter-
national laws.122 Regardless of a host country’s detention poli-
cies, asylum-seekers will always impose some level of risk to 
that country.123 Thus, to argue that U.S. asylum detention is an 
                                                                                                             
 116. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (“likelihood of appearing 
when required”) (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. Id. at 8. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Michael Matza, Immigration Cases Clogging Federal Courts, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 18, 2011, at A2 (“Despite the nationwide hiring of more 
than 40 additional [immigration court] judges in the past year, the number of 
deportation cases, asylum claims, and green-card fraud prosecutions … is at 
an all time high: 275,000 and climbing.”); Dan Moffett, Conveyor Belt to De-
portation: Asylum Cases don’t get Attention they Deserve, PALM BEACH POST, 
Feb. 16, 2010, at A14 (“the system is choked by an exploding caseload and an 
exponential increase in outside pressures…the backlog has gotten progres-
sively worse in the last decade.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Walker, Enhancing Quality 
and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication, Report for the Admin-
istrative Conference for the United States, June 7, 2012, 40–42, available at 
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/Enhancing-
Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-
72012.pdf (suggesting that defensive asylum cases should be heard by asylum 
officers like affirmative cases are, rather than immigration judges, in order to 
speed the process). 
 122. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, at art. 31(2); Protocol to Refugee 
Convention, supra note 15 (incorporating the articles of the Refugee Conven-
tion); See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 228 (noting the fear that 
deterrence is the true rationale behind U.S. detention and parole policies). 
 123. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 1. “Any reduction in global asylum 
numbers have been associated with non-entrée policies, including contain-
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effective deterrence factor is to ignore the reason that people 
are seeking asylum in the first place: they consider the situa-
tion they are fleeing to be worse.124 Risk-analysis tools and 
ATDs can work together to ameliorate the concerns that justify 
detention, and reduce the burden on the U.S. immigration sys-
tem, by allowing for the parole of more asylum-seekers.125 
B. The Importance of Risk-Analysis 
To address these limited, but admittedly legitimate, fears 
and still comply with international obligations, the United 
States needs to assess the level of risk that asylum-seekers 
pose on an individual level, regarding both danger to society 
and risk of flight.126 Risk-analysis tools fill the gap between 
categorical detention and ATDs by ensuring that any method 
used for a person is necessary and not arbitrary, thus comply-
ing with international treaties.127 Detention can be legitimate 
under international law only when an individualized assess-
ment establishes that there is no lesser method that the gov-
ernment can take to mitigate the dangers posed by that partic-
ular non-citizen.128 This is because 
international human rights law requires that detention deci-
sions be made on a case-by-case basis after an individualized 
assessment of the functional and legitimate need of detaining 
a particular individual, the understanding that anyone de-
prived of liberty is entitled to judicial review of this decision, 
                                                                                                             
ment in regions of origin and interception/interdiction measures, or can be 
attributed to large-scale repatriation programmes.” Id. at 1 n.4. 
 124. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]hreats to life or freedom in 
countries of origin are likely to be a greater push factor than any disincentive 
created by detention policies in countries of destination.”). “The principal aim 
of asylum seekers and refugees is to reach a place of safety . . . those who are 
aware of the prospect of detention before arrival believe it is an unavoidable 
part of the journey, that they will still be treated humanely despite being 
detained.” SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 11. 
 125. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22. 
 126. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 17, 20. While this Note focuses on risk-
analysis as the capacity to reduce threats posed to the community, the as-
sessments can also include screening for special vulnerabilities present in the 
individual that require attention. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22. 
 127. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15. 
 128. See, e.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that arbitrar-
iness results unless there is an individualized determination that a person is 
likely to abscond). 
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and that any restriction of liberty should be the least restric-
tive means necessary.129 
An appropriate risk assessment tool would allow the United 
States to screen for the identified threats posed by non-citizens 
entering the country—lack of identity, risk of flight, and risk of 
danger—in order to make decisions about the level of supervi-
sion and support necessary to ensure compliance with the sys-
tem.130 Such a tool could allow the United States to increase 
legitimacy within the system through increased compliance 
while reducing detention costs in favor of less-costly ATDs.131 
One criticism of the efficacy of any risk-assessment procedure 
is that there is a general absence of data at either the national 
or the international level regarding the success or failure of 
asylum-seekers to comply with proceedings or mandates.132 
“The scarcity of governmental statistics with regard to those 
who abscond [or fail to comply with a removal order] severely 
weakens the empirical evaluation of one form of conditional re-
lease in comparison to another.”133 One way to ensure that asy-
lum-seekers are paroled or, if detained, that detention is in the 
least restrictive manner, is to increase predictability of asylum-
seekers absconding by improving data collection via risk as-
sessments.134 
An interesting parallel can be drawn to recent risk and data 
collection paradigms the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 
(“CBP”) has utilized, in the context of national security, regard-
ing the flow of people and goods through U.S. borders.135 In re-
sponse to increasing terror threats against the United States, 
CBP has utilized improved data analysis to distinguish be-
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 130. See SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22 (“[A]ssessment enables authorities 
to make an informed decision about the most appropriate way to manage and 
support the individual as they seek to resolve their migration status and to 
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 131. See Unlocking Liberty, supra note 20, at 41–42 (identifying the short-
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sessment). 
 132. See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 24–25. 
 133. Id. at 25. 
 134. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 18–19. 
 135. See generally CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, CBP Launches Centers to 
Facilitate Processing of Imports, October 20, 2011, available at 
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tween safe and unsafe traffic, goods, and passengers.136 Speed-
ing up the screening process for safe traffic actually increased 
CBP’s ability to focus resources on who or what was a true 
threat.137 Essential to speeding up safe traffic is the sharing of 
information not only within an organization but also between 
an organization and “safe” civilians, across multiple agencies, 
and among nations.138 CBP’s efforts provide a model for the 
way that ICE can speed up the parole of safe detainees in order 
to better focus on those that are unsafe.139 Based on CBP’s 
model, the United States might be able to speed asylum-
seekers into parole or ATDs in a number of ways, such as hav-
ing ICE offices become more efficient at reporting factors con-
tributing to or detracting from compliance; requiring ICE and 
NGOs to compile data on asylum-seekers’ compliance; or by 
sharing statistics with Canada and Mexico relating to risks 
posed by asylum-seekers and ultimate compliance.140 The ex-
pedited process could have similar benefits as those seen by 
CBP—the ability to focus finances and personnel on true 
                                                                                                             
 136. Alan D. Bersin, Lecture, Lines and Flows: The Beginning and End of 
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STRATEGY (2004), available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_pa
trol_ohs/national_bp_strategy.ctt/national_bp_strategy.pdf. For example, the 
Northern Border Project has the goal of developing technology along the 
U.S./Canada border to better address the challenges of protecting that bor-
der. It includes testing an “Apex-Secure Transit Corridor” wherein members 
of the transit industry use government-approved technology when crossing 
the border to streamline the security screening process. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
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 140. Compare id. See also, Holding Patterns, supra note 25, at 28:30–30:18 
(discussing frustration at how detention issues become localized despite the 
fact that many countries face them, but how governments are beginning to 
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threats—while also avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary deten-
tion by releasing individuals who qualify into ATDs.141 To en-
sure that the process does not become discriminatory or too bu-
reaucratic, expert input, trained staff, specific guidelines, and 
formal review should be a part of any new data analysis pro-
cess.142 
While overriding long-standing aversions to sharing between 
countries could be a challenge at any level of cooperation, the 
benefits of increased data sharing and analysis in this digit-
ized, information-driven society outweigh the drawbacks.143 
Data regarding compliance on a national or international level 
could influence detention planning on the whole and decisions 
made in individual cases in the same way data from pilot pro-
grams have already shaped decisions on a smaller scale.144 Ul-
timately, by “designing effective alternatives to detention and 
knowing when they can and should be relied upon to work,” 
risk analysis, supplemented by data collection, can help to re-
duce unnecessary and arbitrary detention.145 
C. Why Alternatives to Detention are Important 
In the spectrum between full detention and unrestrained lib-
erty, ATDs occupy any method that is not at either extreme.146 
These methods include, from the most to the least restrictive: 
in-home detention and electronic monitoring; supervision or 
reporting; residency restrictions; release to community super-
vision; release on bail, bond, or surety; and documentation.147 It 
is important to note, however, that just because a given method 
has been classified as an ATD does not mean it necessarily 
                                                                                                             
 141. See Bersin, supra note 138. See also, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 
35, at 29 (“if the data used during risk assessment is linked appropriately to 
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Border Patrol operates the “U.S. government’s largest collection, storage and 
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 145. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 25. 
 146. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 8–9. 
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complies with international law.148 The intensity of a given 
ATD method varies, but in order to avoid violating internation-
al legal mandates it should comport with the level of risk estab-
lished via risk-analysis on a case-by-case basis.149 Because of 
this, asylum-seekers already eligible for parole without re-
strictions should not be placed in ATD programs that are more 
restrictive than parole as doing so would result in more re-
strictions on liberty than necessary.150 ATDs should be utilized 
for those asylum-seekers who do not require more restrictive 
deprivations of liberty, such as detention, and not as a substi-
tute for lesser restrictions like release on parole.151 
Many ATD methods, if implemented properly, could allow the 
United States to harmonize the delicate balance between the 
systemic risks that lead to over-detention and the international 
human rights laws that only authorize detention as a last re-
sort.152 This is because many ATDs occupy a middle ground, 
addressing the risks that detention is intended to prevent 
while allowing the asylum-seeker to be free from unnecessary 
or arbitrary detention.153 Some programs utilize residency re-
strictions in a variety of ways, including “open centers, semi-
open centers, [or] directed residence” that often allow the asy-
lum-seeker to be released into the community with varying lev-
els of supervision.154 The most successful ATD programs utilize 
a combination of ATD methods designed to meet the needs and 
risks of individual asylum-seekers.155 
Yet even some ATD programs can violate international law; 
methods such as home detention and electronic tagging are 
“very intensive” methods in relation to the restrictions they 
place on liberty and can rise to the level of detention despite 
technical release.156 It is possible that even allowing for release 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. at 9. 
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on bail, bond, or surety—often considered less restrictive and 
typically involving no more restrictions on liberty than a finan-
cial or vouch-person guarantee—may violate international law 
where asylum-seekers remain unnecessarily detained simply 
because they have little access to funds or community sponsors, 
and not because they pose a threat.157 As such, implementing 
these methods alone may not bring the United States into com-
pliance with international law.158 
One example of a successful NGO pilot ATD program is the 
community supervision experiment titled “Appearance Assis-
tance Program” (“AAP”), developed and tested in the late 1990s 
by the Vera Institute of Justice at the request of then-extant 
INS.159 The program provided for asylum-seekers classified in 
its “intensive” track160 to be released from detention to the su-
pervision of AAP staff.161 The supervision included monthly 
monitoring and reporting requirements—both in person and 
via phone—and repeated flight-risk evaluations.162 AAP also 
offered support to asylum-seekers by giving information about 
obligations, hearing dates, the legal process, and the available 
services within the community.163 By utilizing strategic intake 
interviews and supervision that had the potential to alert AAP 
staff of participant non-compliance or the threat thereof, AAP 
staff were able to recommend decreased, constant, or increased 
supervision, or even redetention if necessary.164 Not only did 
asylum-seeker participants have high appearance rates at 
court dates165—93%—thereby addressing the risks used to jus-
                                                                                                             
 157. See, Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 54–55; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, su-
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tify categorical detention,166 but the program also reduced un-
necessary detention by presuming release and only redetaining 
those who violated the conditions of release or who truly were a 
flight risk.167 
III. IMMIGRATION, DETENTION, AND PATH DEPENDENCY 
Despite the expansive reach of ICE and DHS detention pow-
ers, the United States is on the edge of immigration reforms 
that have the potential to change the face of the immigration 
system and could bring the country within the standards man-
dated by international laws.168 The Obama Administration be-
gan to discuss an overhaul of the immigration detention system 
in response to an unfavorable report by a DHS consultant.169 
Since then, a series of developments has energized the reform 
advocates seeking to alter the status quo of immigration and 
detention in the United States.170 Attorney General Eric Holder 
made a 2011 announcement (“PD Memo”) that granted discre-
tion to ICE officers to decline prosecution or detention in a 
number of situations, including those pertaining to asylum-
seekers.171 Additionally, in late 2011, DHS began a review of 
300,000 immigration cases with the aim of implementing the 
PD Memo and allowing the department to focus its limited re-
sources on “deporting foreigners who committed serious crimes 
or pose national security risks.”172 Furthermore, ICE has re-
cently developed and begun testing a risk assessment tool to be 
used in determining parole-eligibility for detainees, slated for 
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nationwide implementation in 2012.173 The United States has 
also consolidated multiple former ATD programs into one – the 
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (“ISAP II”) – and 
executed a contract with a private company to administer it.174 
Finally, several senators introduced a bill during the 112th ses-
sion to enact “comprehensive immigration reform” which in-
cludes provisions for the protection of asylum-seekers.175 
The importance of this reform momentum can be illustrated 
by the theory of path dependency, first popularized by econo-
mist Paul David in the mid-eighties, wherein “individual deci-
sion[-]making early on in the path may lead to a ‘lock-in’ of a 
pattern that is collectively suboptimal.”176 To illustrate the the-
ory, David examined the series of decisions made by individual 
business owners and individual typists to buy and be trained 
on QWERTY keyboard models. The purchase of these key-
boards led to the “lock-in”, or enduring prominence, of the 
suboptimal keyboard configuration long after the technology 
that required said layout had been phased out.177 The lock-in of 
a given method creates “the very heavy disincentives that face 
those who would wish to depart significantly from that which 
has gone before,” and acts to reinforce the existing situation.178 
It is significantly more difficult to alter the course after the 
method becomes “locked-in” because of the “technical interre-
latedness, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility of in-
vestment” that lead to the method becoming entrenched de-
spite other, better, methods being available.179 
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The U.S. detention of asylum-seekers is similar to the 
QWERTY conundrum.180 The prominence of the presumption in 
favor of detention can be, in part, explained by the positive 
feedback loop between the public and political responses to ter-
rorism.181 Decisions made in response to terrorism have con-
tributed to the prominence of mandatory detention for asylum-
seekers, at least until they can prove they are not a risk.182 
Now it is clear that categorical mandatory detention is subop-
timal, as it violates international laws.183 Despite being obso-
lete, the presumption in favor of detention might now be 
locked-in because it is easier to continue using it than to alter 
infrastructure and training to facilitate eliminating it.184 
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Digressing from the path is not impossible.185 Radical devia-
tions from the status quo become more likely when institution-
al frameworks that keep to the current path, like ICE policies 
in favor of detention, meet with unpredictable external forces, 
like the current momentum for U.S. immigration and detention 
reform.186 Like political reform momentum, external forces in 
the path dependency context are “fleeting comings together of a 
number of diverse elements into a new, single combination.”187 
Because of this, U.S. immigration and detention reform is at a 
critical juncture where immense change is possible.188 It is es-
sential that the United States capitalize on this opportunity 
and reform in a way that brings its practice into compliance 
with international law standards as this moment is fleeting 
and changes in the elements, such as the inauguration of a new 
political party into power, could close the window of opportuni-
ty.189 In addition to haste, it is imperative to alter the status 
quo in a way that does actually bring the United States within 
international law mandates because anything else could poten-
tially lock-in a new, equally suboptimal method.190 
IV. IGNORING RECOMMENDATIONS OF ASYLUM EXPERTS LEADS 
TO INEFFICIENT REFORMS IN THE ASYLUM DETENTION SYSTEM 
Rather than taking full advantage of the opportunity to bring 
its immigration and detention system into compliance with in-
ternational human rights law, the United States has construc-
tively ignored the recommendations of asylum experts and, 
thus, recent efforts at progress have failed to amount to any 
significant decrease in unnecessary or arbitrary detention.191 In 
                                                                                                             
 185. David, supra note 23, at 334. 
 186. Wilsford, supra note 178, at 270. 
 187. Id. at 256–58, 270. 
 188. See generally, id. 
 189. See, id. at 254. 
 190. See, David, supra note 23, at 336, stating 
Despite the presence of the sort of externalities that standard static 
analysis tells us would interfere with the achievement of the socially 
optimal degree of system compatibility, competition in the absence of 
perfect futures markets drove the industry prematurely into stand-
ardization on the wrong system – where decentralized decision mak-
ing subsequently has sufficed to hold it. (emphasis in original). 
 191. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Pres-
ton, supra note 7. 
2012] OVER-DETENTION 481 
some instances NGOs have achieved high success rates in de-
signing and piloting programs that implement their recom-
mendations for risk analysis and ATDs.192 However, as this 
Part will illustrate, the United States has repeatedly decided 
against implementing their recommendations and has instead 
moved toward a suboptimal path in which reformed programs 
continue to violate international obligations.193 
A. The United States Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal Risk-
Analysis 
When ICE, DHS, and the Obama Administration pledged an 
overhaul of the U.S. immigration and detention system, they 
identified the need for a risk assessment mechanism that 
would facilitate non-citizens in being either paroled or enrolled 
into ATD programs.194 At the beginning of 2010, ICE worked 
with various NGOs, led by the Lutheran Immigration and Ref-
ugee Service (“LIRS”), to develop this “risk assessment tool.”195 
The exact details of this tool have not been made public.196 
However, both LIRS and Human Rights First indicated that 
ICE’s tool is designed to use “objective criteria to guide deci-
sion-making regarding whether or not an alien should be de-
tained or released; the alien’s custody classification level, if de-
tained; and the alien’s level of community supervision (to in-
clude an ICE ATD program), if released.”197 LIRS noted that 
the tool “includes mathematically weighted factors that should 
signal the likelihood of threat to the community based on past 
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behavior as well as of absconding for each and every individual 
ICE apprehends.”198 
The tool, slated for nationwide implementation in 2012, has 
already garnered criticism from those to whom ICE has grant-
ed advanced exposure.199 In reviewing a pilot version, the 
UNHCR expressed concern that the “tool, based on a mathe-
matical calculation, risks becoming a bureaucratic, tick-box ex-
ercise and may lead only to artificial individual assessments 
rather than real ones. It also appears heavily weighted in fa-
vour of detention.”200 Based on these assessments, it seems that 
this aspect of ICE’s tool could become arbitrary and thus would 
not satisfy international obligations.201 The continued pre-
sumption for detention also violates the guidance for imple-
menting the policies advocated in the UDHR, 1951 Convention, 
1967 Protocol, and ICCPR.202 
Furthermore, although designed subsequent to ICE consulta-
tions with NGOs specializing in asylee and refugee protec-
tion,203 the tool apparently falls short of asylum experts’ rec-
ommendations.204 LIRS, after providing support to ICE in the 
development stages of the tool, found it contains a “total ab-
sence of individualized assessment of risk for people subject to 
mandatory detention. There is also no standard assessment of 
risk with judicial review for people eligible for parole, such as 
arriving asylum-seekers who are found to have a credible fear 
of return.”205 These apparent shortcomings affect the ability of 
the United States to sufficiently satisfy international standards 
by, specifically, avoiding arbitrariness through individualized 
assessments and judicial review.206 
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By ignoring the recommendations of LIRS and other asylum 
experts involved in the development of the tool, ICE squan-
dered a valuable opportunity to comply with international 
law.207 Subsequent to viewing ICE’s new tool, LIRS published 
their recommendations to ICE regarding a risk assessment 
tool.208 It envisions a dynamic individualized assessment pro-
cedure that encourages release, or, if some form of detention is 
necessary, the least restrictive ATD or detention procedure 
necessary to mitigate the risks presented by the individual al-
ien.209 It also allows for review of a determination should there 
be a change in circumstances or risk factors for an asylum-
seeker.210 Had ICE adopted a risk-assessment tool in line with 
these recommendations, it would allow for a greater chance of 
eliminating arbitrary, unnecessary detention.211 Instead, ICE 
has selected a suboptimal path that has the potential to “lock-
in” continuing violations of international human rights law for 
future iterations of the tool.212 
B. ICE Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal ATDs 
In 2004, Congress approved funding for ATD programs and 
ICE solicited bids for the contract to manage them.213 Various 
NGOs—including the Vera Institute—bid for the contract, bas-
ing their qualifications on their expertise in refugee, asylee, 
and immigration services.214 In a further example of the United 
States selecting to move down a suboptimal path, ICE “gave 
the contract to Behavioral Interventions Inc., a private compa-
ny whose model was based on the use of electronic monitor-
ing.”215 Behavioral Interventions Inc. (“BI”) and its parent com-
pany still hold the U.S. ATD contract.216 
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Commonly used in the criminal judicial system, home curfew 
and electronic tagging are the most restrictive ATDs, and, as 
noted above, are considered by some to be an additional form of 
detention.217 BI currently uses ICE’s congressional ATD fund-
ing to combine those most restrictive methods with reporting 
requirements—“installation of biometric voice recognition soft-
ware, unannounced home visits, employer verification, and in-
person reporting to supervise participants”218—to administer a 
single program: the Intensive Supervision Appearance Pro-
gram II (“ISAP II”).219 While for the first time in 2009 ICE in-
cluded the presence of a “needs-based case management com-
ponent” as a requirement for a company to obtain the ATD con-
tract, this appears to be an as yet unfulfilled commitment.220 In 
looking at the restrictive nature of these methods, scholars 
have noted, “sometimes what is called an alternative to deten-
tion may in fact be an alternative form of detention.”221 
This is especially true when considering that “rather than 
looking to the current detention populations and utilizing vari-
ous supervision methods as a step down from unnecessary de-
tention, [ISAP II] is seeking individuals already released into 
the community to increase restrictions of liberty on more peo-
ple.”222 The use of ISAP II in these scenarios remains arbitrary 
and subject to the discretion of the ICE officer analyzing the 
parole eligibility of an asylum-seeker.223 For example, while 
“[a]liens should be assigned conditions of supervision according 
to an assessment of the alien’s flight risk and danger to the 
community[, in ISAP II] assignment to a[n ATD] program is 
determined in part by residency,” as only those asylum-seekers 
detained in close proximity to a regional ISAP II office are eli-
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gible to participate.224 “ICE has not requested-and Congress 
has yet to authorize-sufficient funding to expand ATD pro-
grams nationally-so that any immigration detainee who is eli-
gible for an ATD program could be placed into it.”225 
Furthermore, ICE’s plan for ISAP II “would not use ATDs as 
an alternative that would decrease the use of existing detention 
beds…[t]he total number of individuals in ICE custody or su-
pervision, whether detained on Alternatives to Detention, 
would increase under this plan.”226 Thus, the United States 
continues to unnecessarily detain parole-eligible asylum-
seekers by placing them into ISAP II.227 “ICE’s plan also explic-
itly precludes the use of ATDs for individuals who are techni-
cally subject to ‘mandatory detention.’”228 
V. POLICY BENEFITS TO UNITED STATES SHOULD IT ADOPT THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to the benefit of being in compliance with interna-
tional human rights laws, there are numerous advantages for 
the United States should it adopt the proposed programs.229 
First, the country can maintain its status as a leader in the in-
ternational community in good faith, and a stance of internal 
compliance will better position the country to encourage other 
nations to follow suit.230 Next, much of U.S. foreign policy in 
the war on terror depends on how the country is perceived in 
the international community and among individual popula-
tions.231 Because many people will still be deported, how they 
feel about the process and what they say to others upon return 
to their countries may have an impact on public image in areas 
where the United States desperately needs support.232 A repu-
tation of humanitarian treatment and fair dealings could go a 
long way. 
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Finally, there is an enormous potential for financial sav-
ings.233 Currently, it costs $95 per day to detain an asylum-
seeker, but only $22 per day to support that same person in an 
alternative program.234 Some estimate that the disparity could 
be even more extreme, with ICE overhead costs bringing deten-
tion costs up to $164 per detainee per day while some forms of 
ATDs cost as little as thirty cents per day.235 While the num-
bers include more than just asylum-seekers, the savings asso-
ciated with detaining only those who present a true risk, such 
as only detaining those who have “committed violent crimes, 
the agency could save nearly $4.4 million a night, or $1.6 bil-
lion annually—an 82% reduction in costs.”236 
CONCLUSION  
When coupled with an efficient and individualized risk anal-
ysis program, Alternatives to Detention adequately address the 
risks of releasing the majority of asylum-seekers into the com-
munity during the pendency of their asylum processing.237 In-
stituting this combination would benefit the United States fi-
nancially and in its international standing in addition to allow-
ing the United States to comply with its international human 
rights obligations regarding the detention of asylum-seekers.238 
The United States should move quickly to adopt the recom-
mendations of asylum experts, capitalizing on the current mo-
mentum for reform in the detention system and decisively end-
ing its violations of international human rights laws. 
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